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We generalize the notion of power index for simple games to different orders of criticality,
where the order of criticality represents the possibility for players to gain more power
over the members of a coalition thanks to the collusion with other players. We study the
behaviour of these criticality indices to compare the power of different players within a
single voting situation, and that of the same player with varying weight across different
voting situations. In both cases we establish monotonicity results in line with those
of Turnovec (1998). Finally, we examine which properties characterizing the indices of
Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf are shared by these new indices.
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1. Introduction
In the theory of simple games, power indices based on marginal contributions Straf-
fin [1977]; Dubey et al. [2081] are used to convert information about winning and
losing subsets (i.e., coalitions) of the player set into a personal attribution (of power)
to each of the players, keeping into account the criticality of players over all pos-
sible coalitions (a player i is considered critical for a coalition S containing i, if S
is winning and S without i is not). However, the notion of criticality itself is not
sufficiently rich to encompass all the interaction possibilities among players and,
consequently, the indices based on this notion are not able to distinguish the role of
players across quite different simple games. Consider for instance two simple games
with only two players i and j, and such that in the first game only the grand coali-
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tion {i, j} is winning, whereas in the second game all coalitions, except the empty
set, are winning. The Shapley-Shubik power index Shapley [1953] (or the Banzhaf
one Banzhaf [1965]) yield the same power to both players and in both games, and
this may be basically seen as the consequence of the fact that each player is criti-
cal only once in both situations (precisely, each player is only critical for coalition
{i, j} in the first game, and only for the corresponding singleton coalition in the
second one; see Example 1 for more details). On the other hand, without any fur-
ther assumption about the probability to form coalitions of different size, the two
situations are quite different for the following reason: Suppose that the grand coali-
tion {i, j} forms; in the first game, the grand coalition may be threatened by both
players, while in the second game, this is not true anymore, and each player be-
comes critical only if the other leaves the grand coalition. Of course, an answer to
the question whether a player is more powerful in one game than in the other one is
highly context-specific. Nevertheless, we can argue that the information contained
in the characteristic function of a simple game cannot be adequately represented
by a single attribute which exclusively relies on the notion of criticality.
In order to introduce a more general concept of criticality, in a previous pa-
per, see Dall’Aglio et al. [2016], we analysed those situations in which a governing
majority does not correspond to a minimal winning coalition, i.e. it includes some
parties, called non-critical, in the sense that, differently from the critical ones, they
may recede from the majority, with no effect on the government. Our main inter-
est focused on the matter that a non-critical party may become critical if other
non-critical parties leave the majority; in this way, we introduced different orders
of criticality. More precisely, we defined a party to be critical of order k if it is
necessary that at least k − 1 other non-critical parties leave the majority without
affecting it, before that its defection makes the coalition a losing one. It should be
clear that the order of criticality of a party may be different in the various possible
majorities it may belong to. In view of this, in this paper we want to associate to
each party a unique value that aggregates the different orders of criticality that it
has in the different winning coalitions.
The concept of criticality of the first order is the basis of the first power in-
dices due to Shapley and Shubik Shapley and Shubik [1954] and Banzhaf Banzhaf
[1965]. Other elements may influence the power of an agent; Myerson Myerson
[1977] proposed to use an undirected graph, called communication structure, in
order to represent the relationships among the agents, while Owen Owen [1977]
introduced the a priori unions, or coalition structures, that account for existing
agreements, not necessarily binding, among the agents. In the following years, Dee-
gan and Packel Deegan and Packel [1978] and Holler Holler [1982] defined two new
indices that consider only the minimal winning coalitions, i.e. those coalitions in
which each agent is critical; Johnston Johnston [1978] used a similar model con-
sidering the quasi-minimal winning coalitions, i.e. those coalitions in which at least
one agent is critical. Another important contribution is due to Kalai and Samet
June 25, 2018 14:50 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE criticality˙igtrM
Indices of criticality in simple games 3
Kalai and Samet [1987] that added a weight to the elements characterizing each
agent, besides the issue of criticality. Winter Winter [1989] extended Owen’s idea
of a priori unions by requiring that the different unions may join only according
to a predefined scheme, that he called levels structure. In the years that followed,
some papers dealt with situations in which only some coalitions are feasible, not
only for communication reasons but also for possible incompatibilities among the
agents; we refer to Algaba et al. [2003]; Algaba et al. [2004]; Bilbao et al. [1998];
Bilbao and Edelman [2000]; Gilles et al. [1992]; Brink Van den and Gilles [1996];
Brink Van den [1997]. Recently, in a monodimensional voting space, Amer and
Carreras Amer R., Carreras [2001] considered the ideological distance of the agents
and Fragnelli, Ottone and Sattanino Fragnelli et al. [2009] considered the issue of
contiguity, while Chessa and Fragnelli Chessa and Fragnelli [2011] introduced the
idea of connectedness in a possibly multidimensional voting space.
More in general, given a monotonic simple game, for each order of criticality,
first, we introduce an appropriate criticality index aimed at measuring the number
of times a player is critical of that order (and given the probabilities that various
coalitions will form). Second, we propose a collective index aimed at aggregating
the indices corresponding to different order of criticality into a unique value for
each player. In order to compare our collective index with classical power indices,
we analyse some monotonicity properties for weighted majority games Turnovec
[1998] and we prove that within a given game, the behaviour of a collective index is
coherent with the one of classical power indices, while a disaggregate representation
of the criticality indices provides a more refined picture of the variation of each
player’s power across different games.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide some pre-
liminary notions and notations. Section 3 is devoted to the definition of alterna-
tive indices of criticality and to the analysis of their basic properties. In Section 4
we study some monotonicity properties of a collective index in weighted majority
games. Section 5 reconsiders the criticality indices in the light of the properties
that characterize the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. Section 6 presents some
computational examples for the indices introduced in the previous sections. Section
7 concludes with some open problems.
2. Preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utility (TU-game) is a pair (N, v), where N =
{1, 2, ..., n} denotes the finite set of players and v : 2N → R is the characteristic
function, with v(∅) = 0. v(S) is the worth of coalition S ⊆ N , i.e. what players in
S may obtain standing alone.
A TU-game (N, v) is simple when v : 2N → {0, 1}, with S ⊆ T ⇒ v(S) ≤ v(T )a
and v(N) = 1. If v(S) = 0 then S is a losing coalition, while if v(S) = 1 then S is
a This property is called monotonicity.
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a winning coalition. Given a winning coalition S, if S \ {i} is losing then i ∈ N is a
critical player for S. When a coalition S contains at least one critical player for it,
S is a quasi-minimal winning coalition; when all the players of S are critical, it is a
minimal winning coalition. A simple game may be defined also assigning the set of
winning coalitions or the set of minimal winning coalitions.
A particular class of simple games is represented by the weighted majority games
(w.m.g). A vector of weights (w1, w2, ..., wn) is associated to the players that leads to
the following definition of the characteristic function of the corresponding weighted
majority game (N,w):
w(S) =
{
1 if
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q
0 otherwise
, S ⊆ N,
where q is the majority quota. A weighted majority situation (w.m.s.) is often de-
noted as [q;w1, w2, ..., wn]. Usually, we ask that the game is proper or N-proper, i.e. if
S is winning then N\S is losing; for this aim it is sufficient to choose q > 12
∑
i∈N wi.
Note that a simple game may not correspond to any weighted majority situation.
Given a TU-game (N, v), an allocation is a n-dimensional vector (xi)i∈N ∈ RN
assigning to player i ∈ N the amount xi; an allocation (xi)i∈N is efficient if x(N) =∑
i∈N xi = v(N). A solution is a function ψ that assigns an allocation ψ(v) to every
TU-game (N, v) belonging to a given class of games G with player set N .
For simple games, and in particular for weighted majority games, a solution is
often called a power index, as each component xi may be interpreted as the per-
centage of power assigned to player i ∈ N . In the literature, several power indices
were introduced; among others, we recall the following definitions.
The Shapley-Shubik index Shapley and Shubik [1954], φ, is the natural version
for simple games of the Shapley value Shapley [1953]. It is defined as the average
of the marginal contributions of player i w.r.t. all the possible orderings and it can
be written as:
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N,S3i
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
mi(S), i ∈ N,
where n and s denote the cardinalities of the set of players N and of the coalition
S, respectively and mi(S) = v(S)− v(S \ {i}) denotes the marginal contribution of
player i ∈ N to coalition S ⊆ N,S 3 i.
The Banzhaf index Banzhaf [1965], β, is similar to the Shapley-Shubik index,
but it considers the marginal contributions of a player to all possible coalitions,
independently from the order of the players; first, we define:
βi(v) =
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆N,S3i
mi(S), i ∈ N.
Consider the following properties:
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• Anonymity
Let pi be a permutation of the set of players N ; a solution ψ satisfies
anonymity if ψi(v) = ψpi(i)(piv) for each i ∈ N , where piv is the game
in which piv(S) = v(pi(S)) for each S ⊆ N .
• Null player
A player i ∈ N is a null player if v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S) for each S ⊆ N \ {i}; a
solution ψ satisfies null player property if ψi = 0 for each null player i ∈ N .
• Transfer
A solution ψ satisfies the transfer property if, given two games v and w
with the same set of players N , then ψ(v) + ψ(w) = ψ(v ∨ w) + ψ(v ∧ w),
where v ∨ w = max{v, w} and v ∧ w = min{v, w}, with (v ∨ w)(S) =
max{v(S), w(S)} and (v ∧ w)(S) = min{v(S), w(S)} for each S ⊆ N .
• Banzhaf total power
A solution ψ satisfies the Banzhaf total power property if
∑
i∈N
ψi =∑
i∈N
1
2n−1
∑
S⊆N,S3i
mi(S).
The Shapley-Shubik index is the unique efficient solution that satisfies the prop-
erties of Anonymity, Null player and Transfer Dubey [1975], while the Banzhaf index
is characterized by the properties of Anonymity, Null player, Transfer and Banzhaf
total power Dubey and Shapley [1979].
Given a simple game (v,N), we reconsider the definition of criticality given in
Dall’Aglio et al. [2016]:
Definition 1. Let k ≥ 0 be an integer, let M ⊆ N , with |M | ≥ k+ 1, be a winning
coalition. We say that player i is critical of the order k + 1 for coalition M , via
coalition K, with |K| = k iff K ⊆M \ {i} is a set of minimal cardinality such that
v(M \K)− v(M \ (K ∪ {i})) = 1 (1)
The meaning of the definition is that K is a coalition of minimal cardinality
such that M \K is still a winning coalition, while M \ (K ∪ {i}) becomes a losing
oneb.
In the above definition, coalition K is often omitted and we simply say that i is
critical of a certain order for coalition M .
Notice also that, when k = 0, K = ∅, thus, a player is critical of order 1 if and
only if it is critical in the usual sense.
Example 1. (Following the discussion in the Introduction) Consider two simple
games (N, u) and (N,w) with N = {1, 2} and such that u({1, 2}) = 1, u({1}) =
u({2}) = 0 and w({1, 2}) = w({1}) = w({2}) = 1. Both players 1 and 2 are critical
of the first order for coalition {1, 2} in game u, while each player i ∈ N is critical of
bIn other terms, v(M \ T ) = 0 or v(M \ (T ∪ {i}) = 1 for any T ⊂M \ {i} with |T | < k.
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the first order for coalition {i} in game w. Moreover, each player i ∈ N is critical
of the second order for coalition {1, 2} via the other player j 6= i in game w.
Example 2. Consider a simple game (N, v) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} as the set
of players and the following minimal winning coalitions (any superset of them is
winning):
{1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 2, 5} {1, 3, 4} {1, 3, 5}
If we consider the winning coalition M = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, player 1 is critical of the
first order, i.e. critical in the usual sense. Player i = 2, 3 is critical of the second
order (consider K = {2, 3} \ {i}), while player i = 4, 5 is critical of the third order
(consider K = {2, 4, 5}\{i} or K = {3, 4, 5}\{i}). If we consider M = N the order
of criticality for the first 5 players does not change, while player 6 is never critical:
He cannot have any role in changing the status of a coalition.
The following results hold: i) Let M ⊆ N be a winning coalition, then the players
in M may be partitioned according to their order of criticality, including the subset
of those players that are never critical (Corollary 1 in Dall’Aglio et al. [2016]); ii)
Let i ∈M be a player critical of the order k+ 1, k ≥ 1 for coalition M , via coalition
K ⊂ M ; if a player j ∈ K leaves the coalition, then i is a player critical of the
order k for coalition M \ {j}, via coalition K \ {j} (Proposition 3 in Dall’Aglio et
al. [2016]); iii) If player i ∈ M is critical of the order k + 1 for coalition M , via
coalition K ⊂ M \ {i}, then in K there are at most h − 1 players critical of order
not greater than h, h = 1, ..., k, otherwise i should be critical of order at most k.
3. Indices of criticality
The aim of this section is to introduce an index for measuring the criticality of an
agent. The starting point is the formula in Shapley and Shubik Shapley and Shubik
[1954], that is based on the number of swings for each agent considering all the
possible orderings of the agents. The motivation of this choice is to have an index
that coincides with the Shapley-Shubik index when the criticality order is one.
The Shapley-Shubik index in a weighted majority game v can be defined as the
average number of times in which a player is critical w.r.t. a coalition when players
enter the coalition in a random order. More formally, for any i ∈ N , let
φi(v) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Π
σi(pi) (3)
where pi is any permutation of N , Π is the class of all permutations and
σi(pi) =
{
1 if player i is critical in P ipi ∪ {i}
0 otherwise
and P ipi is the set of players in N that precede i in the order pi.
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We may, therefore, introduce an index which measures for any player i his power
in being k order critical, with k = 1, 2, . . . , n.
φi,k(v) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Π
σi,k(pi) (5)
with
σi,k(pi) =
{
1 if i is critical of order k in Ppi ∪ {i}
0 otherwise
With simple combinatorial arguments, we may write these indices in a way that
is familiar to anybody working with the Shapley-Shubik index:
φi,k(v) =
∑
S 63i
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
dck(i, S ∪ {i}) (7)
where
dck(i,M) =
{
1 if i is critical of order k in the winning coalition M
0 otherwise
(8)
We may therefore associate a whole distribution of indices of criticality to a player:
Φi(v) = (φi,1(v)φi,2(v), . . . , φi,n(v))
Example 1. It is immediate to verify that: Φ1(u) = Φ2(u) =
(
1
2 , 0
)
and Φ1(w) =
Φ2(w) =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
Example 2. With the aid of Mathematica, we computed the distribution of indices
for every player:
Φ1(v) =
(
17
30
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
Φ2(v) = Φ3(v) =
(
3
20
,
3
10
, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
Φ4(v) = Φ5(v) =
(
1
15
,
3
20
,
1
5
, 0, 0, 0
)
Φ6(v) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
Recalling the efficiency property for the Shapley-Shubik index, we have∑
i∈N
φi,1(v) =
∑
i∈N
φi(v) = v(N) = 1 (10)
Some bounds can be established.
Proposition 1. The following inequalities hold
1 ≤
n∑
k=1
∑
i∈N
φi,k(v) ≤ n (11)
and these are sharp, i.e., they can be attained.
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Proof. Clearly, by (10)
n∑
k=1
∑
i∈N
φi,k(v) ≥
∑
i∈N
φ1,k(v) = 1
To verify that the bound can be attained, consider the following game
v(S) =
{
1 if S = N
0 otherwise
Clearly, the players are symmetrical and no player can be critical beyond the first
order. Thus
Φi(v) =
(
1
n
, 0, . . . , 0
)
To prove the second inequality, note that no player can be critical of more than one
order. Therefore, for any permutation pi ∈ Π,
n∑
k=1
∑
i∈N
σi,k(pi) ≤ n (15)
Thus, recalling the definition (5),
n∑
k=1
∑
i∈N
φi,k(v) =
n∑
k=1
∑
i∈N
1
n!
∑
pi∈Π
σi,k(pi) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Π
n∑
k=1
∑
i∈N
σi,k(pi) ≤ n
the inequality deriving from (15).
The following game achieves the upper bound
v(S) =
{
0 if S = ∅
1 otherwise
Now, in each permutation pi of N , player pi(1) is critical of the first order, player
pi(2) is critical of the second order, player pi(3) is critical of order 3, and so on.
Therefore,
Φi(v) =
(
1
n
, . . . ,
1
n
)
and the upper bound is reached.
In the example ??, player 6 exhibits null values because it is always non-critical.
To point out the role of non-critical players, we may introduce a suitable index:
φi,NC(v) =
∑
S 63i
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
dcNC(i, S ∪ {i})
where
dcNC(i,M) =
{
1 if i is never critical in the winning coalition M
0 otherwise
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Example 2. Again, using Mathematica, we obtain:
φ1,NC(v) = φ2,NC(v) = φ3,NC(v) = φ4,NC(v) = φ5,NC(v) = 0 φ6,NC(v) =
23
60
The Shapley-Shubik index of power is naturally paired with the (non-
normalized) Bahnzaf index. This index counts the proportion of times that a certain
player is critical w.r.t. any coalition that includes him. It is thus natural to define
a Bahnzaf index of criticality of any order:
βi,k(v) =
∑
S 63i
dck(i, S ∪ {i})
2n−1
(21)
Also in this case we have a distribution of indices:
Bi(v) = (βi,1(v)βi,2(v), . . . , βi,n(v))
and an index of non-criticality
βi,NC(v) =
∑
S 63i
dcNC(i, S ∪ {i})
2n−1
Now, we return to the introductory examples.
Example 1. Since the weights in (7) and (21) coincide when n = 2, then we have
B1(u) = B2(u) =
(
1
2 , 0
)
and B1(w) = B2(w) =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
.
Example 2. Here, the values differ from the Shapley-derived:
B1(v) =
(
5
8
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
B2(v) = B3(v) =
(
1
4
,
3
16
, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
B4(v) = B5(v) =
(
1
8
,
3
16
,
1
16
, 0, 0, 0
)
B6(v) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
and
B1,NC(v) = B2,NC(v) = B3,NC(v) = B4,NC(v) = B5,NC(v) = 0 B6,NC(v) =
5
16
The indices of power provide an easy-to-use and easy-to-understand means to
compare the capability of players in being decisive, i.e. critical in forming a winning
coalition. When we extend these notions by including higher order of criticality, we
need to compare distributions (i.e. vectors) of indices. In what follows,we provide
numeric indices that synthesize the whole distribution and allow the comparison of
power among players.
Definition 2. The Collective Shapley-Shubik (CSS) power index through all orders
of criticality for player i ∈ N is defined by
Φ¯i(v) =
∑n
h=1 φi,h(v)h
−1∑n
h=1 h
−1 (24)
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Similarly, the Collective Banzhaf (CB) power index through all orders of criticality
for the same player is
B¯i(v) =
∑n
h=1 βi,h(v)h
−1∑n
h=1 h
−1 (25)
Those two indices range between 0 and 1, but no result concerning their total
power – something similar to the efficiency property for Shapley-Shubik index, or
the Bahnzaf total power, is currently knownc. Their importance lies in their ability
to compare the power of different players. Let us denote as CSS (CB , resp.) the
order established among the players by the Collective Shapley-Shubik (Collective
Bahnzaf, resp.) index.
Example 1. By relation (24), it is easy to calculate the collective Shapley index
for the two players in the games u and w, we have: Φ¯1(u) = Φ¯2(u) =
1
3 and
Φ¯1(w) = Φ¯2(w) =
1
2 . Notice that the collective Shapley index emphasizes the
different role of the two players over the games u and w (while the Shapley-Shubik
index is the same in the two games). Identical conclusions hold for CB.
Example 2. Clearly
Φ¯1(v) =
34
147
Φ¯2(v) = Φ¯3(v) =
6
49
Φ¯4(v) = Φ¯5(v) =
25
294
Φ¯6(v) = 0
and
B¯1(v) =
25
98
B¯2(v) = B¯3(v) =
55
392
B¯4(v) = B¯5(v) =
115
1176
B¯6(v) = 0
Clearly,
1 CSS 2 ∼CSS 3 CSS 4 ∼CSS 5 CSS 6 ,
and the same order applies through the Collective Bahnzaf index.
4. Monotonicity properties for weighted majority games
As we said in the Preliminaries, a particular class of simple games is represented by
the weighted majority games.
When it comes to measuring power in committees or parliaments, most often a
party’s power is not perfectly proportional to its size. However, if no impediment
c The lower bound is obvious, all the quantities being non-negative; as both φi,h(v) and βi,h(v)
are never larger than 1, for any i and h, then the numerators in both (24) and (25) are not greater
than the denominators, so the upper bound holds.
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occurs, the rankings in power and in size should agree within the same assembly
and across different assemblies, when the weights clearly show the advantage of a
party over the others. These situations are captured by the following properties:
Definition 3. Let [q;w1, . . . , wn] be a w.m.s. and let vm be the corresponding game.
A power index ψ :W(N)→ Rn+ is locally monotone whenever wi > wj implies
ψi(vm) ≥ ψj(vm)
Consider now two weighted majority situations [q;w1, . . . , wn] and [q;w
′
1, . . . , w
′
n],
with ∑
i∈N
wi =
∑
i∈N
w′i = C, (28)
Let vm and v
′
m be the corresponding games. The power index ψ is globally monotone
if
wi∗ > w
′
i∗ and wj ≤ w′j for all j 6= i∗ (29)
implies
ψi∗(vm) ≥ ψi∗(v′m)
Turnovec Turnovec [1998] shows that the (first order) Shapley-Shubik power
index is both locally and globally monotonic. The same properties apply to the
(non-normalized) Banzhaf power index. We now extend these properties to the
Collective indices just introduced.
Adapting Turnovec Turnovec [1998], we define the sets
Ciks(vm) := {S ⊂ N : i is critical of order k w.r.t. S and |S| = s}
and
Ciks(vm) :=
⋃
`≤k
Ci`s(vm)
We can now write the Shapley-Shubik index of criticality of any order k as
φi,k(vm) =
n∑
s=1
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
|Ciks(vm)|
where, as usual, | · | denotes the cardinality of a set.
A similar expression is found for the CSS index
Φ¯i(vm) =
n∑
s=1
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
(∑n
h=1 |Cihs(vm)|h−1∑n
h=1 h
−1
)
(34)
Simpler expressions hold for the Bahnzaf-type indices
βi,k(vm) =
n∑
s=1
|Ciks(vm)|
2n−1
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and
B¯i(vm) =
n∑
s=1
1
2n−1
(∑n
h=1 |Cihs(vm)|h−1∑n
h=1 h
−1
)
(35)
We begin by showing the local monotonicity of the indices.
Lemma 1. Consider a w.m.s. [q;w1, . . . , wn], and the associated game vm. Then,
wi > wj implies
|Ciks(vm)| ≥ |Cjks(vm)| for any k, s = 1, . . . , n. (36)
Proof. Assume wi > wj . We now show that to any S ∈ Cjks(vm) there corresponds
a set S′ ∈ Ci`s(vm) with ` ≤ k. Since no pair of sets S′ coincide, this proves (36).
Since S ∈ Cjks(vm), then |S| = s, and there exists K ⊂ S \ {j}, |K| = k − 1,
such that
vm(S \K) = 1 vm(S \ (K ∪ {j})) = 0 (37)
and the K is the set of minimal cardinality satisfying (37). Denoting K˜ = S \ (K ∪
{j}), we may restate (37) as
vm(K˜ ∪ {j}) = 1 vm(K˜) = 0 (38)
We now consider several cases
Case 1. i ∈ K ⊂ S. We show that i is critical of order k or lower for the same
coalition S by showing that an analogous of (37), or, equivalently, (38), holds for S,
i and K ′ = K ∪ {j} \ {i}. We do not need to check whether this is a set of minimal
cardinality, as long as we do not care about the exact order of criticality for player
i.
Now S = K ′ ∪ K˜ ∪ {i},
vm(S \K ′) = vm(K˜ ∪ {i}) ≥ vm(K˜ ∪ {j}) = 1,
by (38), with the inequality justified by the assumption wi ≥ wj . Moreover, by (38)
again,
vm(S \ (K ′ ∪ {i}) = vm(K˜) = 0 .
Case 2. i ∈ S \K. We show that i, S and K satisfy an analogous of condition
(38). This time S = K ∪ K˜ ′ ∪ {i} with K˜ ′ = K˜ ∪ {j} \ {i}. Now (38) and the
assumption imply,
vm(S \K) = vm(K˜ ′ ∪ {i}) = vm(K˜ ∪ {j}) = 1
and
vm(S \ (K ∪ {i})) = vm(K˜ ′) = vm(K˜ ∪ {j} \ {i}) ≤ vm(K˜) = 0 .
Case 3. i /∈ S. We now show that i is critical of order k or lower w.r.t. coalition
S′ = S ∪ {i} \ {j} of size s. Here S′ = K ∪ K˜ ∪ {i}, while conditions (38) imply:
vm(S
′ \K) = vm(K˜ ∪ {i}) ≥ vm(K˜ ∪ {j}) = 1
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and
vm(S
′ \ (K ∪ {i})) = vm(K˜) = 0 .
Once again, player i is critical of order k or lower for a coalition of cardinality s
This leads to
Theorem 1. Both CSS and CB are locally monotonic
Proof. If wi > wj , Lemma 1 shows that∑n
h=1 |Cihs(vm)|h−1∑n
h=1 h
−1 ≥
∑n
h=1 |Cjhs(vm)|h−1∑n
h=1 h
−1 for any s = 1, . . . , n,
and, therefore, that Φ¯i(vm) ≥ Φ¯j(vm) and B¯i(vm) ≥ B¯j(vm).
To verify the global monotonicity of the same indices, we need to compare the
two w.m.s. [q;w1, . . . , wn] and [q;w
′
1, . . . , w
′
n], and the corresponding games, vm and
v′m under (28) and (29). The first Lemma is, in its essence, a reworking of a result
by Turnovec.
Lemma 2 (Turnovec Turnovec [1998], Lemma 5). Suppose (28 and (29) hold.
Then for any P ⊂ N \ {i∗} we have
vm(P ∪ {i∗}) ≥ v′m(P ∪ {i∗}) and vm(P ) ≤ v′m(P ) (42)
Proof. By (28) we can write
wi∗ = C −
∑
j 6=i∗
wj w
′
i∗ = C −
∑
j 6=i∗
w′j
and by (29) we have
wi∗ − w′i∗ =
∑
j 6=i∗
(w′j − wj) ≥
∑
j∈P
(w′j − wj) ≥ 0 .
Therefore,
wi∗ +
∑
j∈P
wj ≥ w′i∗ +
∑
j∈P
w′j
and ∑
j∈P
wj ≤
∑
j∈P
w′j
which leads to (42)
To establish global monotonicity we need another Lemma.
Lemma 3. Assumptions (28) and (29) imply
|Ci∗ks(vm)| ≥ |Ci∗ks(v′m)| for any k, s = 1, . . . , n. (45)
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Proof. We will show that, if S ∈ Ci∗ks(v′m), then S ∈ Ci∗`s(vm) for some ` ≤ k.
In fact, for such a coalition S we have that there exists K ⊂ S \ {i∗}, |K| = k − 1
such that
v′m(S \K) = 1 and v′m(S \ (K ∪ {i∗})) = 0 (46)
and any T ⊂ S \ {i∗} with cardinality lower than k − 1 does not satisfy both
equations.
A straightforward application of Lemma 2 yields
vm(S \K) ≥ v′m(S \K) = 1
and
vm(S \ (K ∪ {i∗})) ≤ v′m(S \ (K ∪ {i∗})) = 0
and, therefore, concludes the proof.
This leads to
Theorem 2. Both CSS and CB are globally monotonic.
Proof. If assumptions (28) and (29) hold, Lemma 3 shows that∑n
h=1 |Ci∗hs(vm)|h−1∑n
h=1 h
−1 ≥
∑n
h=1 |Ci∗hs(v′m)|h−1∑n
h=1 h
−1 for any s = 1, . . . , n,
and, therefore, that Φ¯∗i (vm) ≥ Φ¯∗i (v′m) and B¯∗i (vm) ≥ B¯∗i (v′m).
Remark 1. Turnovec Turnovec [1998] shows (Theorem 4) that, under suitable
symmetry assumptions, global monotonicity implies local monotonicity for power
indices. Whether this fact applies here as well remains an open question.
5. First steps toward a characterization
We may ask which among the properties that characterize the indices of Shapley-
Shubik and Banzhaf may be used for characterizing the criticality indices. We begin
with an easy result.
Proposition 2. The criticality indices Φ, Φ¯, B and B¯ satisfy anonymity and null
player properties.
Proof. It is straigthforward, after noticing that relations (7) and (21) satisfy the
two properties.
As previously noted, no property concerning the efficiency or the total power is
known for these indices. Also the transfer property is not satisfied, as the following
example shows.
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Example 3. Consider the following example where N = {1, 2, 3}, v is the simple
game whose unique minimal winning coalition is {1, 2} and w is the simple game
whose minimal winning coalitions are {1, 3}, {2, 3}. In this case, we have:
index/game v w v ∨ w v ∧ w
Φ1
(
1
2 , 0, 0
) (
1
6 ,
1
3 , 0
) (
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0
) (
1
3 , 0, 0
)
Φ2
(
1
2 , 0, 0
) (
1
6 ,
1
3 , 0
) (
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0
) (
1
3 , 0, 0
)
Φ3 (0, 0, 0)
(
2
3 , 0, 0
) (
1
3 ,
1
3 , 0
) (
1
3 , 0, 0
)
Φ¯
(
3
11 ,
3
11 , 0
) (
2
11 ,
2
11 ,
4
11
) (
3
11 ,
3
11 ,
3
11
) (
2
11 ,
2
11 ,
2
11
)
B1
(
1
2 , 0, 0
) (
1
4 ,
1
4 , 0
) (
1
2 ,
1
4 , 0
) (
1
4 , 0, 0
)
B2
(
1
2 , 0, 0
) (
1
4 ,
1
4 , 0
) (
1
2 ,
1
4 , 0
) (
1
4 , 0, 0
)
B3 (0, 0, 0)
(
3
4 , 0, 0
) (
1
2 ,
1
4 , 0
) (
1
4 , 0, 0
)
B¯
(
3
11 ,
3
11 , 0
) (
9
44 ,
9
44 ,
9
22
) (
15
44 ,
15
44 ,
15
44
) (
3
22 ,
3
22 ,
3
22
)
It is easy to check that the transfer property does not hold, as in v ∨ w and v ∧ w
the players are symmetric, while in v and w they are not.
More generally, the following result holds.
Proposition 3. The transfer property is not satisfied by any weighted average of
the Shapley-Shubik (Banzhaf resp.) indices of criticalities of all orders, with strictly
positive weights.
Proof. Referring to Example 3, notice that Φ3(v) + Φ3(w) =
(
2
3 , 0, 0
)
and Φ3(v ∨
w) + Φ3(w ∧w) =
(
2
3 ,
1
3 , 0
)
and no set of posistive weights can equate the averages
of the two distributions.
In view of this, we need other properties for characterizing the criticality indices.
6. Examples
Consider Example 3 in Dall’Aglio, Fragnelli, Moretti (2016). In the weighted major-
ity situation [51; 44, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3], party 1 is critical of order 1, while the other six
parties are critical of order 4 and there are no parties critical of order 2 or 3. If we
account the ordering (we write the weights of the parties instead of their numbers):
44, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3
the fourth party is critical of order 1, the fifth party is critical of order 2 via the
fourth party (or the second, or the third), the sixth party is critical of order 3 via
the fourth and the fifth parties (or any pair of parties from the second to the fifth),
the seventh party is critical of order 4 via the fourth, the fifth and the sixth parties
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(or any triple of parties from the second to the sixth). The same reasoning applies
to all the permutations of the parties with weight 3.
Accounting the ordering:
3, 3, 3, 3, 44, 3, 3
the fifth party is critical of order 1, the sixth party is critical of order 3, the seventh
party is critical of order 4. Again, the same reasoning applies to all the permutations
of the parties with weight 3.
If we consider all the possible orderings we have Table 1, where the Roman
number below each party after the critical one denotes its order of criticality.
Table 1. Orders of criticality for each ordering of the parties in [51; 44, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3].
44 3 3 3 3 3 3
I II III IV
3 44 3 3 3 3 3
I II III IV
3 3 44 3 3 3 3
I II III IV
3 3 3 44 3 3 3
I II III IV
3 3 3 3 44 3 3
I III IV
3 3 3 3 3 44 3
I IV
3 3 3 3 3 3 44
I
In terms of distributions, we have
Φ1 =
(
24
42
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
Φ2 = · · · = Φ7 =
(
3
42
,
4
42
,
5
42
,
6
42
, 0, 0, 0
)
Φ¯ =
(
80
363
,
3
40
, ...,
3
40
)
B1 =
(
21
32
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
B2 = · · · = B7 =
(
5
32
,
5
32
,
5
64
,
1
64
, 0, 0, 0
)
B¯ =
(
245
968
,
1
10
, ...,
1
10
)
Now, consider Example 1 in Dall’Aglio, Fragnelli, Moretti (2016). In the
weighted majority situation [51; 40, 8, 5, 5, 5], party 1 is critical of order 1, while
the other four parties are critical of order 2. If we consider all the possible orderings
we have Table 2.
In terms of distributions, we have
Φ1 =
(
1
2
, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
Φ2 =
(
1
4
,
1
5
, 0, 0, 0
)
Φ3 = Φ4 = Φ5 =
(
1
12
,
3
10
, 0, 0, 0
)
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Table 2. Orders of criticality for each ordering of the parties in [51; 40, 8, 5, 5, 5].
40 8 5 5 5
I II II
40 5 8 5 5
I II II
40 5 5 8 5
I II
40 5 5 5 8
I II
8 40 5 5 5
I II II
5 40 8 5 5
I II II
5 40 5 8 5
I II
5 40 5 5 8
I II
8 5 40 5 5
I II II
5 8 40 5 5
I II II
5 5 40 8 5
I II
5 5 40 5 8
I II
8 5 5 40 5
I II
5 8 5 40 5
I II
5 5 8 40 5
I II
5 5 5 40 8
I II
8 5 5 5 40
I
5 8 5 5 40
I
5 5 8 5 40
I
5 5 5 8 40
I
Φ¯ =
(
30
137
,
21
137
,
14
137
,
14
137
,
14
137
)
B1 =
(
1
2
, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
B2 =
(
3
8
,
1
16
, 0, 0, 0
)
B3 = B4 = B5 =
(
1
8
,
3
16
, 0, 0, 0
)
B¯ =
(
30
137
,
195
1096
,
105
1096
,
105
1096
,
105
1096
)
Now, consider the weighted majority situation [12; 10, 2, 2, 1, 1], party 1 is
critical of order 1, while the other four parties are critical of order 3 and there are
no parties critical of order 2. If we consider all the possible orderings we have Table
3.
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Table 3. Orders of criticality for each ordering of the parties in [12; 10, 2, 2, 1, 1].
10 2 2 1 1
I II 0 III
10 2 1 2 1
I 0 II III
10 2 1 1 2
I 0 II III
10 1 2 2 1
I II III
10 1 2 1 2
I II III
10 1 1 2 2
I II III
2 10 2 1 1
I II 0 III
2 10 1 2 1
I 0 II III
2 10 1 1 2
I 0 II III
1 10 2 2 1
I II III
1 10 2 1 2
I II III
1 10 1 2 2
I II III
2 2 10 1 1
I 0 III
2 1 10 2 1
I II III
2 1 10 1 2
I II III
1 2 10 2 1
I II III
1 2 10 1 2
I II III
1 1 10 2 2
I II III
2 2 1 10 1
I III
2 1 2 10 1
I III
2 1 1 10 2
I III
1 2 2 10 1
I III
1 2 1 10 2
I III
1 1 2 10 2
I III
2 2 1 1 10
I
2 1 2 1 10
I
2 1 1 2 10
I
1 2 2 1 10
I
1 2 1 2 10
I
1 1 2 2 10
I
In terms of distributions, we have:
Φ1 =
(
7
10
, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
Φ2 = Φ3 =
(
7
60
,
11
60
,
1
5
, 0, 0
)
Φ4 = Φ5 =
(
1
30
,
1
10
,
1
5
, 0, 0
)
ΦNC =
(
0, 0, 0,
7
60
,
7
60
)
Φ¯ =
(
42
137
,
33
274
,
33
274
,
9
137
,
9
137
)
B1 =
(
13
16
, 0, 0, 0, 0
)
B2 = B3 =
(
3
16
,
1
4
,
1
16
, 0, 0
)
B4 = B5 =
(
1
16
,
1
8
,
1
16
, 0, 0
)
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BNC =
(
0, 0, 0,
3
16
,
3
16
)
B¯ =
(
195
548
,
20
137
,
20
137
,
35
548
,
35
548
)
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced a new notion of criticality index that generalizes
the classical one of power index to different orders of criticality. It turns out that
the representation of the players’ interaction in terms of the n-dimensional vector
containing all criticality indices (where n is the size of the player set) is a good
compromise between the exponentially high complexity associated with the charac-
teristic function, and the rough sketch provided by a personal attribution of power
to each player. A first attempt to aggregate such criticality indices into a collective
one is also presented and studied with respect to several monotonicity properties in
weighted majority games. Notice that the majority of the results dealing with the
Shapley index and the Banzhaf index in this paper, may be easily adapted to every
semivalue Dubey et al. [2081].
An open question for future research concerns a better understanding of the
nature of power associated to each index of criticality: how such a power may be
carried out by means of the bargaining abilities of players? which trade-off exists
between the different orders of criticality and between the corresponding indices?
Another interesting issue is related to an alternative interpretation of the in-
dices of criticality in terms of the likelihood that a coalition will form. For instance,
following Example 1, according to the index of criticality of second order, the for-
mation of the grand coalition seems to be more likely in game u, where players
have a null critical index of second order, than in game w, where such an index
is one-half for both players. In other words, it is not clear whether the indices of
criticality may be used to compare the possibility that a coalition will form over
different games with equivalent distribution of (first order) criticality.
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